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1 . Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoreti-
cal argument and some examples which sup-
port the hypothesis that cultural norms have
a large impact on determining the society's
development path. In fact, in the economic
literature, some scholars regard culture, cul-
tural norms, and social norms as crucial in-
stitutions for economic development. While
some of them approach to the issue mainly
from historical and descriptive analyses
(Boserup 1970: Ch.1, Kuran 2003 and Plat-
teau 2000), the theoretical study of this sub-
ject, though still in its nascency, has a
growing literature (Aoki 2001, Basu 1995,
Greif 1994, and Greif, Milgrom and Weingast
1994).
The theoretical study may be classified
into two groups by the range of perspectives
and the analytical tools employed. Greif and
his collaborators analyze some particular
merchant-agent relationships in pre-modern
societies within a framework of the princi-
pal-agent One-Side Prisoner's Dilemma
(OSPD) game. On the other hand, Aoki and
Basu introduce various concepts of evolutio-
nary game theory and suggest their applica-
bility to development issues in the general
and somewhat abstract context. In my pre-
liminary model, I try to develop Basu's evolu-
tionary game-theoretic approach with much
emphasis on the existence of cultural norm
constraints. In the part of case studies, to be
more specific like Greif and his collaborators,
I show some examples to support my theo-
retical results. In this respect, this paper
may be viewed as an attempt to provide a
bridge between these two types of theoretical
analyses.
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides a definition of cul-
tural norms, and then argues about their
effects with a special reference to their im-
pact on the societies' development path. Sec-
tion 3 presents evolutionary game-theoretic
models which analyze the economic perform-
ance of societies with different cultural
norms. Some interesting examples and fur-
ther theoretical application are presented in
section 4 to strengthen my arguments. Sec-
tion 5 summarizes the findings of the paper
and suggests some directions for further re-
search.
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2 . Cultural Norms and Economic Deve-
lopment: An Overview
The main hypothesis of this paper is that, as
shown in the previous section, the differences
of cultural norms have a large impact on the
societies' economic performance. Before for-
mulating theoretical models, I shall address
two basic and natural questions to the hy-
pothesis. First of all, what are cultural
norms anyway? Second, through which
channels may the cultural norms make an
impact on the societies' economic perform-
ance?
2.1 Definition of Cultural Norms
Basu (1995) defines the word "civil norms" in
the context of an evolutionary game theory
as follows:
Denote Si a whole strategy set of player
i, and Ti any subset of Si. A T is defined
as a civil norm to which an agent of the
game may adhere. Suppose an agent i
adheres to a civil norm T, it means that
he chooses the optimal strategy from
within T and considers strategies in S
minus T as ones which one ought not to
use. (Basu 1995, p.25)
Thus, it may include the ones which do not
originate from cultural factors (for example,
it may include an environmental self-
regulation recommended by an international
NGO) and seems to be a broader concept
than cultural norms. Although I do not take
up this concept directly to analyze, I modify
it to my definition of a cultural norm since it
reasonably suits my evolutionary game-
theoretic approach in the next section. Here
I define a "cultural norm" as a cultural factor
which restricts a player to choose only a sub-
set of a whole strategy set in a game.1 It
seems fair to say that this definition of a cul-
tural norm makes sense not only as an ana-
lytical setting but as a reflection of reality.
This definition implies that a cultural norm
is a sort of institutions, following the defini-
tion by Nabli and Nugent (1989).2
2.2 Effects of Cultural Norms on Economic
Development
Can we find any analytical reasoning to the
second question about the channels through
which cultural norms make an impact on the
societies' economic performance? Some scho-
lars argue that the Islamic cultural norms
such as (i) its conservative commercial cus-
toms (Greif (1994)), and (ii) its egalitarian
inheritance system and lack of long-term en-
terprise activities (Kuran 2003) are apt to
cause economic underdevelopment, since
those norms usually prevent economic agents
from choosing labor specialization and large-
scale investment decisions (both physical and
human capital). Likewise, Platteau (2000)
regards cultural egalitarian norms in Sub-
Saharan Africa as an obstacle for develop-
ment since they also retard incentives of
investments.
There are, however, some counterargu-
ments: one of them is from a viewpoint of
collective action theory. Collective action in-
duced by cultural norms may conduce to eco-
nomic efficiency by solving free-rider prob-
lems (Nabli and Nugent 1989, section 4) and
by formulating focal point solutions that
may reduce transactions costs (Schelling
1960, Ullman-Margalit 1977).
After all, the mechanisms to relate cul-
tural norms to economic performance are
complex and the net effect can be either
positive (growth-enhancing) or negative
論 文
CHUKYO KEIEI KENKYU Vol. 22 No. 1・2122
(growth retarding). What one may say is
that cultural norms do matter for economic
development and we should carefully exam-
ine the mixed effects (figure 1).
3 . The Model
This section presents a theoretical frame-
work that may illustrate the relationship be-
tween economic performance of societies and
their cultural norms. I employ infinitely re-
peated random-matching games in the con-
text of evolutionary game theory since it is
tractable to capture the societies' responses
and evolution in the dynamic context.
3.1 Benchmark Random-Matching Game with-
out Cultural Norms
First, as a benchmark case, we look at a ran-
dom-matching game when there is no differ-
ence in cultural norms between societies.
There are two societies (Society 1 and 2) and
they are exactly identical. Both consist of
"normal" members all and two of them are
randomly matched within each society.
There is no difference in cultural norms, and
no migration. A couple of the players
matched are assigned a project that needs
their joint efforts. They can choose one of
the three strategies, that is, {stay away,
fight, cooperate}.
(i) If at least one of them stay(s) away,
both of the players' payoffs will be zero,
because the project needs their joint ef-
forts.
(ii) If both of them choose to cooperate,
then both will invest in the project and get
a same net payoff (2, 2).
(iii) If one of them cooperates and the
other fights, the fighter will defeat the co-
operator and steal the money that the co-
operator invests. No investment occurs.
The fighter gets 2, while the cooperator
suffers loss of -2.
(iv) If both of them fight, both of the play-
ers' lose a unit by the fight. No investment
occurs.
Thus, the payoff matrix of this game for
both societies (because they are now identi-
cal) is as in table 1. As you can readily
check, there are four Nash equilibria in this
game, that is, (SA, SA) ＝ (0, 0), (F, SA) ＝
(0, 0), (SA, F)＝(0, 0) and (C, C)＝(2, 2).3
Among these equilibria, which is most likely
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Table 1: Payoffs of Benchmark Random-Matching





SA (0, 0)* (0, 0)* (0, 0)
F (0, 0)* (-1,-1) (2,-2)
C (0, 0) (-2, 2) (2, 2)**
Note: 1) SA: stay away. F: fight. C: cooperate.
2) * shows a Nash equilibrium.
3) ** shows a Nash and evolutionary sta-
ble strategy equilibrium (ESSE).
to be achieved in the context of this infinitely
repeated and perfect-information game? In-
tuitively speaking, an equilibrium which is
stable against small numbers of irrational
behaviors (it can be, for example, either a
player's mistake, or mutant invasion when I
allow migration4). Such an equilibrium is
called an "evolutionary stable strategy equi-
librium (ESSE)" in the context of evolution-
ary game theory, though there is no space
for an extended discussion on the concept of
ESSE here.5 In this particular setting, one
may easily find that the socially optimal out-
come (C, C) ＝ (2, 2) is the only ESSE which
is most likely to be achieved repeatedly.
Since both societies are identical, both will be
on the same optimal development path.
3.2 Random-Matching Game with Cultural
Norms
Next, I introduce a cultural norm in this
game, that is, a "collectivism and egalitarian"
norm. Following Basu (1995), denote Si a
whole strategy set of player i, and Ti any
subset of Si. A Tc is defined as a "collectivi-
stic and egalitarian" norm. While Si ＝ {SA,
F, C} as shown in the previous game, I define
Tc ＝ {SA, C} here. In other words, the colle-
ctivistic and egalitarian norm is an institu-
tion which constraints players not to take
the hostile "fight" strategy. In addition, the
norm also affects the payoff structure as we
see below. Suppose now that one society con-
sists of only the normal-type members (nor-
mal society), and the other has only the
members who are constrained by the
collectivistic and egalitarian norm (collectiv-
ist society). Still there is no migration.
(i) For the normal society, nothing
changes from the benchmark game since
there are only normal type members in the
society and no migration.
(ii) For the collectivist society, the first
change happens when cooperate-cooperate
situation. Since all members share the
collectivistic and egalitarian norm, follow-
ing the reasoning in the previous section,
they tend to suffer underinvestment (or
are prevented from specialization) and
then the payoff of the case (C, C) goes
down to (1, 1). The second change is that,
by definition above, members are re-
stricted to use only the strategy of SA, or
C. F is not available for both players and
this choice is shadowed in matrix 2-2 (in
table 2).
What are Nash equilibria in this setting?
For the society 1 (normal society), as I see
above, everything is same as the benchmark
case. There are four Nash equilibria, and the
only ESSE is (C, C) ＝ (2, 2) which is most
likely to be achieved and is socially optimal.
Now, interesting features can be seen in
the society 2 (collectivist society). In this
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Table 2: Payoffs of Random-Matching Game with Cultural Norms
Matrix 2-1: Society 1 (Normal Society) Matrix 2-2: Society 2 (Collectivist Society)







SA (0, 0)* (0, 0)* (0, 0) SA (0, 0)* (0, 0) (0, 0)
F (0, 0)* (-1,-1) (2,-2) F (0, 0) (-1,-1) (2,-2)
C (0, 0) (-2, 2) (2, 2)** C (0, 0) (-2, 2) (1, 1)**
Note: 1) SA: stay away. F: fight. C: cooperate.
2) * shows a Nash equilibrium.
3) ** shows a Nash and ESSE.
collectivistic and egalitarian society, there
are two Nash equilibria, namely, (SA, SA) ＝
(0, 0) and (C, C) ＝ (1, 1), and the only ESSE
which is most likely to be achieved is (C, C)
＝ (1, 1). But note that (C, C) ＝ (1, 1) can-
not be an equilibrium if the strategy of F is
not restricted by the collectivistic and egali-
tarian norm. In other words, the collecti-
vistic and egalitarian norm works to keep the
intra-socially optimal outcome alive. One
more point to note here is that (C, C) ＝ (1,
1) is an optimal equilibrium in the collectiv-
ist society, but it is dominated by the payoff
of the ESSE, (C, C) ＝ (2, 2), in the normal
society. These findings imply that the differ-
ences of cultural norms have an impact on
the societies' economic performance. In this
particular case, the collectivistic and egali-
tarian society can achieve an intra-socially
optimum outcome but is inter-socially out-
performed by the normal society.
3.3 Game with Cultural Norms and Migration
But there may be a question to the model
with a cultural norm above. Since the two
societies are isolated in the model, it seems to
be just saying that it is all about the differ-
ence of the levels of investment that deter-
mine the growth path of the societies.6
Actually, what is missing in the previous
model is the possibility of migration between
these two societies. Does the introduction of
migration bring a different story, namely,
the worldwide domination of the economi-
cally efficient system? The answer is, inter-
estingly enough, negative in my particular
setting.
Suppose that this is an infinitely re-
peated game and, in every period, a small
proposition (say, 0.1％) of the members of
each society migrate to the other one. Let me
assume:
(i) The populations of the two societies are
originally identical.
(ii) The migrants cannot change their cul-
tural norm even after migration.
(iii) The resources that the migrants can
bring in the new place are perishable.
Thus, if they get zero or negative payoff in
the period they migrate, they will die.
(iii) In this setting, in each society, there is
a small possibility of type-mismatching.
In the normal society, there is a small pos-
sibility (at 0.1％) that a normal member is
matched with a collectivist, and vice-versa
in the collectivist society. In these mis-
match cases, nothing changes but the out-
come of cooperate-cooperate situation. By
assumption before, in case of cooperation,
the levels of investment are different be-
tween normal members (high investment)
and collectivists (low investment). In the
case of mismatching cooperation in the
normal society, the players obtain differ-
ent returns, that is, (Ccolle, Cnorm) ＝ (1/2, 1)
that reflects their different investment lev-
els. In the case of the normal society, how-
ever, egalitarian rules work: the players
are restricted to an ex-post equalization of
the investment returns, even if the player's
investment level is different. That is,
(Ccolle, Cnorm) ＝ (3/4, 3/4). The whole struc-
ture of this game is shown in table 3 (in-
cluding Matrix 3-1-b and 3-2-b).
In case of collectivist-collectivist and
normal-normal matching (that occurs with
99.9％ probability in each society), every-
thing is same as the game in subsection b)
above. What are striking are the cases of
mismatching: in each case of mismatching,
there are same two Nash equilibria, that is,
(SA, SA) ＝ (0, 0) and (SA, F) ＝ (0, 0).7
Thus, by assumption, all the migrants die
after the period (since they get zero payoffs
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at any equilibrium) and the homogeneity of
the type of the society members is preserved.
Of course, new 0.1％ migrants are coming in
the next period, but they will also die after
the period. This is an example that a colle-
ctivistic norm may bring inter-socially
Pareto-inferior outcomes but the norm is im-
mune to the migration of individualistic
agents. In other words, the introduction of
the possibility of migration does not ensure
the convergence of the pace of economic
growth. In this setting, underdevelopment
persists in the collectivist society.
3.4 Migration to the Third Intermediate Country
A simple but interesting extension of the
model is a migration model from both of the
two societies to an intermediate country
which owns 50％ of normal type members
and 50％ of collectivist members. To analyze
this setting, one may necessarily introduce
mixed strategy equilibrium concept. In this
setting, there is a certain possibility that mi-
grants have positive payoff, thus the popula-
tion structure of the third society changes as
time goes by. Intuitively speaking, normal
type migrants have more chance to survive
(since they have higher payoffs at equilib-
rium) and thus this type gradually domi-
nates this third society. The implication of
this model is, therefore, quite simple: if the
third society's population is fairly mixed and
if we allow the possibility of migration, the
type which attains higher payoff in equilib-
rium may dominate majority of the popula-
tion in the third society.
4 . Examples, Empirical Evidence and
Further Theoretical Applications
I here take up two examples to support the
implications of the theoretical framework in
the previous section. The first example is
Greif's (1994) famous story about the compe-
tition between Maghribi (which represents
Muslim society) and Genoese (which repre-
sents Latin society) merchants in the pre-
modern era. So far as the relative efficiency
of these two culturally distinct systems is
concerned, Greif (1994) suggests that
Genoese individualistic system may have
been more efficient in the long run in the con-
text of Mediterranean trade competition.8
Genoese individualistic norms become finally
pervasive in the Mediterranean trade net-
work, although the fact that Muslim com-
mercial norms still remain in some Middle
Eastern regions until now may imply their
evolutionary stability in some societies. This
example is strongly consistent with the set-
tings and implications of my models.
The second example is diversity of the
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Table 3: Payoffs of Random-Matching Game with Cultural Norms and Migration
Society 1 (Normal Society)
a) Normal v.s. Normal
>Same as Matrix 2-1
Society 2 (Collectivist Society)
a) Collectivist v.s. Collectivist
>Same as Matrix 2-1
Matrix 3-1-b: Collectivist v.s. Normal Matrix 3-2-b: Collectivist v.s. Normal







SA (0, 0)* (0, 0)* (0, 0) SA (0, 0)* (0, 0)* (0, 0)
F (0, 0) (-1,-1) (2,-2) F (0, 0) (-1,-1) (2,-2)
C (0, 0) (-2, 2) (1/2, 1)** C (0, 0) (-2, 2) (3/4,3/4)
Note: 1) SA: stay away. F: fight. C: cooperate.
2) * shows a Nash equilibrium.
organizational structure of multinational en-
terprises (MNEs). Even under the stiff com-
petition in the global market, organizational
arrangements (labor contracts, financial
structures, technology development mecha-
nisms, and so on) of MNEs seem to be sig-
nificantly different depending upon their
nationalities. It is particularly interesting
that Japanese MNES in the auto-related and
electric goods industries, which are said to
have collectivistic characteristics, have deci-
sive competitive strength over individualistic
Anglo-Saxon MNEs. Thus, the relative effi-
ciency between collectivist and individualist
organizations in this special case is contrary
to the one in Greif's (1994) case above.
Let me focus on the second example
which is, at a glance, difficult to understand
in the context of my modeling in the previous
section. Is this showing any insufficiency of
my modeling? I examine this question here
in two stages: first, is there really any evi-
dence to show that Japanese MNEs are
collectivistic? If the answer to this question
is positive, then, may I provide a reasonable
modification in my modeling to explain the
diversity and relative efficiency of MNEs?
4.1 Do Japanese MNEs Have Similar Features
with Greif (1994)'s Collectivistic Socie-
ties?
In the literature on the organizational struc-
ture of MNEs, there is fairly general agree-
ment on the point that Japanese firms share
certain collectivistic culture, as opposed to
the individualistic culture of Anglo-Saxon
firms; one of the differences in the economic
literature is whether they deal with the cul-
tural factors explicitly (Itagaki 1997) or not
(Kojima 1978 and Caves 1985).
Thus, it seems reasonable to hypothesize
that the behavior of Japanese companies
resembles Greif's (1994) collectivist societies.
Here, I would like to focus attention on an
empirical investigation whether Japanese
MNEs are segregated and collectivistic in the
sense of Greif's (1994)'s model and have a
tendency to send more directors from the
headquarters to their foreign affiliates than
other individualistic MNEs do. I take up a
comparison of Japanese and American
MNEs since they are a good reflection on col-
lectivist and individualist societies, respec-
tively. In addition to this, some other
behavioral patters in MNEs such as (i) the
differences in organizational structures and
(ii) different valuation on information shar-
ing, are briefly examined later on to confirm
the validity of my arguments.
4.2 Data Source and Sample Selection and
Statistical Outlook
First, to pick up American MNEs' affiliates
operating in Japan (American affiliates in
Japan, hereafter), I use data from the pub-
licly available Japanese database, Kaisha
Shikihou (KS, The Dictionary of Japanese
Listed Companies), Fall 2011 edition, pro-
vided by Toyo-Keizai Shinpo-sha. Second, to
select Japanese MNEs' affiliates operating in
U.S. (Japanese affiliates in U.S., hereafter),
I use data from the database, Kaigai
Shinshutsu Kigyo Ichiran (KSKI, The Dic-
tionary of Japanese Companies Operating
Abroad), 2011 edition, provided by the same
publisher, Toyo-Keizai Shinpo-sha. These
are standard databases used by academic
scholars and management professionals to
analyze listed companies in Japan and their
foreign affiliates. The KS covers 3,596 listed
companies in Japan and the KSKI does 22,400
Japanese foreign affiliates. From these data-
bases, I obtain cross-section data on 133 af-
filiates, which can be decomposed into 26
Cultural Norms and Economic Performance
中京経営研究 第22巻 第1・2号 127
American affiliates in Japan and 107 Japa-
nese affiliates in U.S.
Before turning to the regression model-
ing, let me show a statistical outlook of the
133 sample companies. I use the same sample
in my empirical analysis later.
Table 4, indicating the industrial distri-
bution of Japanese affiliates in U.S. (the sec-
ond and third column) and Japanese affili-
ates in U.S. (the fourth and fifth column),
vividly illustrates the different features of
these two groups. The table proves that
about two-fifths of Japanese affiliates in
U.S. are concentrating only in the auto-
related industry and 14 per cent in the elec-
trical and electronics goods industry. On the
other hand, for American ones in Japan, the
share of service sector is remarkably high,
more than three-fifths.
Next, table 5 summarizes the basic sta-
tistics of these sample companies. It com-
pares the mean values of Japanese and
American affiliates in terms of (i) the share
of the directors who are sent from their
headquarters, and (ii) whether the top of
BOD, such as a chairperson, the CEO, a man-
aging director, is sent from their headquar-
ters (yes is counted by 1; otherwise, 0), (iii)
the shareholding of parent companies, (iv)
age, (v) sales turnover, and (vi) the number
of employees. As the table indicates, Japa-
nese affiliates in U.S. are, relatively speak-
ing, owned in large proportion by the parent
companies (87.6 per cent vis--vis 51.5 per
cent), old (19.1 years vis--vis 16.8 years),
small in sales scale (470 million U.S. dollars
vis--vis 2,654 million) and employment (920
vis--vis 5,415).
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Table 4: Industrial Distribution
J. Affiliates (in U.S.) A. Affiliates (in Japan)
Number Share (％) Number Share (％)
1) Auto Related 43 40.2 3 11.5
2) Chemical 12 11.2 2 7.7
3) Electrics & Electronics 15 14.0 2 7.7
4) Foods 3 2.8 1 3.8
5) Service/IT 0 0.0 7 26.9
6) Service/Others 15 14.0 9 34.6
7) Machinery 14 13.1 0 0.0
8) Metals & Ceramics 3 2.8 1 3.8
9) Others 2 1.9 1 3.8
Total 107 100.0 26 100.0
Source: (1) Japanese affiliates in U.S.: Kaigai Shinshutsu Nippon Kigyo Soran, 2011, Toyo-keizai Shinposha.
(2) American affiliates in Japan: Kaisha Shikihou, Fall 2011, Toyo-keizai Shinposha.
Table 5: Summary Statistics of the Sample Companies
SHHQ TPHQ P's Share Age Sales Employees
[1] J. Affiliates (in U.S.) 0.639 0.692 0.876 19.1 470 920
[2] A. Affiliates (in Japan). 0.284 0.308 0.515 16.8 2,654 5,415
Differential ([1]-[2]) 0.355*** 0.384*** 0.361** 2.3 -2,184*** -4,495***
Source: Same as table 1.
Notes: (1) Means of top's nationality are calculated using the binary measure {If from its parent company=1,
if not=0}.
(2) Sales volume: Million U.S.$.
(3) *** Significant at 1 per cent, **Significant at 5 per cent.
More noteworthy are the differentials in
their decision of managerial delegation.
First, the proportion of the directors from
their headquarters (SHHQ in table 2) in
Japanese affiliates in U.S. is markedly lower
than the one of Americans in Japan (63.9 per
cent vis--vis 28.4 per cent). Second, the
probabilities that the top of the directors is
sent from their headquarters also differ
sharply: the probability that the top of Japa-
nese affiliates in U.S. is from their headquar-
ters (TPQC in table 5) is higher than the one
in American affiliates in Japan (62.9 per cent
vis--vis 30.8 per cent). The differentials be-
tween these two groups are both statistically
significant at 1 per cent level. These findings
appear to support my hypothesis that Japa-
nese MNEs have a tendency to send more
(top) directors from the headquarters to
their foreign affiliates than American MNEs
do. However, these decisive differentials may
be, at least to some extent, due to the fact
that the share of parent company ownership
in Japanese affiliates is higher than that of
Americans. The aim of the regression analy-
sis in the next section is, therefore, to look at
the difference in managerial delegation deci-
sions between Japanese and American
MNEs, after controlling the effects of the
share of parent company ownership (and
other controls).
4.3 Empirical Models and Findings
The following regression models examine the
hypothesis spelled out in the last section:
that is, whether Japanese MNEs have a ten-
dency to send more (top) directors from the
headquarters to their foreign subsidiaries
than American MNEs do. Dependent vari-
able of model 1 and model 2 are (i) the pro-
portion of the directors from their head-
quarters (SHHQ) and (ii) the probability
that the top of the BOD is sent from their
headquarters, respectively. I apply OLS esti-
mation for model 1 and probit model estima-
tion for model 2.9 For each model, I include
some control variables which may have im-
pacts on the decision of director appoint-
ment.
[Model 1] SHHQ＝β0＋β1 PSH＋β2 SAL＋
β3 AGE＋β4 JPD＋β5 SVD＋β6 ITD＋β7
ATD＋ε (OLS estimation),
[Model 2] TPHQ＝β0＋β1 PSH＋β2 SAL＋
β3 AGE＋β4 JPD＋β5 SVD＋β6 ITD＋β7
ATD＋ε (probit model estimation).
The most crucial independent variable
for my analysis is JPD, a Japanese MNE
dummy variable which represents whether
the firm belongs to Japanese affiliates in
U.S. Among controls, the proportion of par-
ent company's shareholding (PSH) is ex-
pected to have strong positive impacts on the
dependent variables in each model. In addi-
tion to this, I chose sales turnover (SAL),
age of the company (AGE), and three indus-
try dummies (a service industry dummy
(SVD), an IT industry dummy (ITD) and an
auto-related industry dummy (ATD)) as
controls. Age variable has a reasonable ex-
pectation to produce a negative effect (the
older the company is, the more managerial
delegation to indigenous talents).
4.3.1 Directors Sent from the Headquarters
(SHHQ) and Japanese MNE Dummy
Column 1 and 2 of table 6 summarizes the es-
timation results of model 1 for all 133 Japa-
nese and American affiliates.
First and foremost, I can find that Japa-
nese MNE dummy has a positive and statisti-
cally significant impact on the proportion of
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the directors from their headquarters. This
result indicates that my main hypothesis,
which says that Japanese MNEs have a ten-
dency to send more directors from the head-
quarters to their foreign subsidiaries than
American MNEs do, is strongly supported
by evidence. The significance is robust whe-
ther the industry dummies are included (col-
umn 2) or not (column 1). If I take up the
case with the industry dummies, Japanese
MNE dummy brings 20 per cent higher pro-
portion of the directors sent from their head-
quarters compared to American affiliates in
Japan.
Second, among control variables, parent
company's shareholding has a positive and
statistically significant impact on the de-
pendent variable, as was expected. Other
controls, however, does not play any signifi-
cant role in the regressions. Age of the com-
pany has a negative impact on the dependent
variable as was expected, but the effect is not
statistically significant.
4.3.2 Top of the Directors Sent from the
Headquarters (TPHQ) and Japanese
MNE Dummy
The results of model 2 are shown in column 3
and 4 in table 6. As I mentioned earlier, I em-
ployed probit model estimation for this
model.
First, let me look at the specification
without the industry dummies (column 3).
In this case, Japanese MNE dummy has a
positive and statistically significant impact
on the probability that the top of the BOD is
sent from their headquarters. Computation
of marginal effect (when Japanese MNE
dummy goes 0 to 1) using this specification
shows that the probability that Japanese
MNEs send the top of the BOD from the
headquarters is 18.2 per cent higher than the
one that American MNEs do. This result
confirms the robustness of my main hy-
pothesis in terms of top managerial delega-
tion. What is interesting, however, is the
result of the specification with the industry
dummies (column 4). In this setting, signifi-
cance of Japanese dummy disappears and
then the auto industry dummy shows a
strong positive correlation with the depend-
ent variable. Judging from the fact that 26
out of 29 auto-related companies in the sam-
ple are Japanese affiliates in U.S., it seems
reasonable to suppose that, among Japanese
MNEs, auto-related ones are specifically con-
servative in the sense that they are more
likely to send the top of the BOD from the
headquarters.
So far as the other controls are con-
cerned, the results are broadly similar with
the ones in model 1. Parent company's share-
holding has a strong positive effect on the de-
pendent variable and the correlation is
statistically significant. Sales, age, and the
industry dummies, except for the auto indus-
try dummy, are insignificant in the regres-
sions.
4.4 An Application: MNE Penetration Game
with Corporate Culture
Now I move to the second question raised at
the beginning of this section: may I provide a
reasonable application of my modeling to ex-
plain the diversity and relative efficiency of
MNEs?
In order to examine this question, I
apply the previous settings to the case of
MNE penetration. I call this game "MNE
penetration game with corporate culture".
Suppose that this is a repeated game
and, in every period, a small proposition
(say, 0.1％) of the MNEs of each country
penetrate into the other one. Let me assume:
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(i) MNEs have their own corporate cul-
ture. The MNEs originating from a collec-
tivist country (C-MNEs) share "collectivist
culture". On the other hand, the MNEs
from an individualist country (I-MNEs)
share "individualist culture". The MNEs
cannot change their corporate culture even
after penetrating into the other country.
(ii) The resources that the MNEs can
bring in the new place are perishable.
Thus, if they get zero or negative payoff in
the period they penetrate, they will die.
(iii) C-MNEs always bring their business
partner from their origin country. In
other words, C-MNEs do not play random-
matching game when they penetrate into
the individualist country). On the other
hand, I-MNEs play random-matching
game when they penetrate into the collec-
tivist country.10
(iv) The whole structure of this game is
shown in table 7. For the case of I-MNEs'
penetration into the collectivist country,
the outcome is quite similar with one of the
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Table 6: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable SHHQ TPHQ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method OLS OLS Probit Probit
Independent Variables:
Parent's Shareholdings 0.484*** 0.481*** 1.485*** 2.948***
[0.091] [0.098] [0.547] [0.741]
Sales Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age of the Company -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.005
[0.002] [0.002] [0.011] [0.011]
Japanese MNE dummy 0.186*** 0.200*** 0.567* -0.526
[0.059] [0.073] [0.350] [0.467]
Service Industry Dummy 0.015 -0.114
[0.054] [0.325]
IT Industry Dummy 0.026 0.104
[0.070] [0.433]
Auto Industry Dummy 0.007 1.606***
[0.049] [0.406]
Constant 0.069 0.050 -1.058*** -1.901***
[0.072] [0.087] [0.442] [0.591]
Adjusted R Squared 0.377 0.363 0.121 0.247
Number of Observations 133 133 133 133
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) ***1％ significant, **5％ significant, *10％ significant
Table 7: Payoffs of MNE Penetration Game with Corporate Culture
Matrix 7-1: I-MNE in C-Country Matrix 7-2: C-MNE in I-Country







SA (0, 0)* (0, 0)* (0, 0) SA (0, 0)* (0, 0) (0, 0)
F (0, 0)* (-1,-1) (2,-2) F (0, 0) (-1,-1) (2,-2)
C (0, 0) (-2, 2) (1/2,1) C (0, 0) (-2, 2) (1, 1)**
Note: 1) SA: stay away. F: fight. C: cooperate.
2) * shows a Nash equilibrium.
3) ** shows a Nash and ESSE.
mismatch case in the previous migration
game. Nothing changes but the outcome
of cooperate-cooperate situation. In case
of cooperation, the levels of investment are
different between I-MNEs (high invest-
ment) and their collectivist partner (low
investment). Thus, the players obtain dif-
ferent returns, that is, (Ccolle, Cind) ＝
(1/2, 1) that reflects their different invest-
ment levels. This is because, in the context
of modern MNEs' foreign investments, it
seems to be unreasonable to assume that
egalitarian profit-sharing rules work be-
tween partners even in the collectivist
country. This is a typical case of Pris-
oner's Dilemma which leads to two Nash
equilibria, that is, (SA, SA) ＝ (0, 0) and
(SA, F) ＝ (0, 0). Thus, by assumption, I-
MNEs penetrating into the collectivist
county cannot survive.
(v) On the contrary, C-MNEs which pene-
trate into the individualist country bring
their partner from their origin country.
Thus, for this case, there are two Nash
equilibria, namely, (SA, SA) ＝ (0, 0) and
(C, C) ＝ (1, 1), and the only ESSE which
is most likely to be achieved is (C, C) ＝ (1,
1). C-MNEs in the individualist country
survive and can keep their operation in the
next period.
(vi) In the context of this MNE penetra-
tion game, collectivist MNEs retain the
edges to globalize their activities while the
individualist MNEs have no opportunity to
keep their operation abroad. This specifi-
cation is ad-hoc but still informative to il-
lustrate that relative efficiency between
collectivist and individualist organizations
are, after all, case-dependent.
5 . Summary and Some Future Direc-
tions for Research
This paper is an attempt to provide a theo-
retic framework to explain the relationship
between cultural norms and the societies' eco-
nomic performance. Let me now summarize
the findings of this paper as follows.
(i) The mechanisms to relate cultural
norms to economic performance are com-
plex and the net effect can be either posi-
tive or negative. What I can say is that
cultural norms do matter for economic de-
velopment and the mixed effects should be
carefully examined.
(ii) A collectivistic and egalitarian norm
may work to keep a specific society's so-
cially optimal outcome alive. In a particu-
lar case, the collectivistic and egalitarian
society can achieve an intra-socially opti-
mum outcome but is inter-socially outper-
formed by the normal society.
(iii) Interestingly, introducing migration
in the model does not bring any difference
in the results above in a particular setting.
In other words, the possibility of migra-
tion does not ensure the convergence of the
pace of economic growth. Underdevelop-
ment may persist in the collectivist society.
(iv) Greif (1994) suggests that Genoese in-
dividualistic system may have been more
efficient in the long run in the context of
Mediterranean trade competition and this
example is strongly consistent with the
settings and implications of my models.
(v) It is interesting that Japanese MNES
in the auto-related and electric goods in-
dustries, which are said to have collecti-
vistic culture, have decisive competitive
strength over individualistic Anglo-Saxon
MNEs. The relative efficiency between
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collectivist and individualist systems in
this special case seems to be contrary to
the one that Greif (1994) suggested in the
case of Mediterranean trade competition.
MNE penetration game implies that the
collectivist MNEs may retain the edge to
globalize their activities while the individu-
alist MNEs have no chance to keep their
operation abroad.
Since my discussion in the present paper
focuses on the tip of the iceberg of this sub-
ject, it may be fruitful to suggest a line of re-
search which will yield rich dividends in the
future. The first issue is theoretical. In this
paper, I employed a stationary view of cul-
tural norms in the models for analytical sim-
plicity. However, as Basu (1995, p.32) sug-
gests, "norms do change and undergo
mutations" after all. In fact, evolutionary
game theory is intrinsically well-suited to
examining such the dynamics of institutional
changes. To capture the dynamic changes in
cultural norms and analyze the impact on the
process of economic development in the con-
text of evolutionary game theory is an inter-
esting extension.
The second one is empirical. To test my
hypothesis that cultural norms are a crucial
determinant of economic development, the
simplest empirical setting seems to be em-
ploying various "culture" dummies in the re-
gression. Cultural factors, however, may
have indirect effects on growth by executing
impacts on the policy factors that correlate
with growth. In this respect, Easterly and
Levine's (1997) work, though in somewhat
different context, shows some methodologi-
cal benchmark.
Last but not least, I would like to men-
tion about the relative efficiency of the two
distinct economic systems, namely, collecti-
vistic and individual societies. In my
specification, relative efficiency and growth
performance between the different economic
organizations is path-dependent and case-
dependent. Although my specification here
is ad-hoc, the conclusion is consistent with
the arguments claimed by Aoki (1988, 2001)
and Greif (1994). The challenge left out is to
generalize the conditions under which
collectivistic organizations retain efficiency
edges and under which individualist organi-
zations do. This is an important (although
too involved to treat here in detail) subject
and I leave an extension of my interest to
this direction for my future research topic.
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Notes
1 This definition, then, naturally raises a ques-
tion to the definition of "culture" and "cul-
tural factors", but I leave this issue untou-
ched since it is too involved a subject to be
treated here in detail.
2 They define an institution as "a set of con-
straints which governs the behavioral rela-
tions among individuals or groups" (Nabli
and Nugent 1989, p.1335).
3 For analytical simplicity, I restrict the equi-
librium concept only to pure strategy equilib-
ria and ignore the possibilities of mixed
strategy equilibria.
4 In this sense, I implicitly assume the bounded
rationality of the game's players.
5 For a formal definition of the ESSE, see Basu
(1995), pp.23-24.
6 Tomoya Matsumoto kindly pointed out this
question and helped develop a migration
model.
7 There is no ESSE in this case.
8 Here I implicitly assume that the word, "nor-
mal" society, in the previous games can be re-
placed by "individualistic" society.
9 I also tried logit model estimation and OLS
estimation for model 2, but the results re-
main qualitatively the same.
10 Recall the statistical fact that Japanese MNEs'
mean ownership in their American affiliates
is decisively higher than the American MNEs'
mean ownership in their Japanese affiliates
(87.6 per cent and 51.5 per cent, respectively).
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